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1974 SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS

V. INJUNCTIONS AND DAMAGES UNDER THE'
WILLIAMS ACT-DEFENSIVE MECHANISMS,
PUNITIVE SANCTIONS, REMEDIAL DEVICES
A.

Purpose of Relief

Faced with the rapidly expanding use of the tender offer to effect
corporate takeovers, Congress passed the Williams Act amendment
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 The purpose of the Act,
consistent with the federal securities laws generally, was the protection of the investing public.2 In the tender offer situation the specific
investors the Act seeks to protect are the small shareholders of target
companies who are often caught between tendering their shares at a
premium price, or retaining their shares with the hope of future profits.' The Act provides for the disclosure of information which will
enable the investor to make an intelligent decision whether to sell to
the offeror, or to retain his shares.'
Because Congress did not provide any remedial sanctions in the
Williams Act, the courts have been forced to take the initiative in
fashioning remedies. The administrative convenience and availability of the injunction have made it the pro forma relief granted by the
courts for any violation of the Act.' The temporary injunction is
Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, adding Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1970).
2 See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967). See also Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9-10 (1971).
See Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1969).
The Williams Act added to the Exchange Act certain provisions designed to
protect the investor. These include: (1) a required filing by the offeror of certain
information with the SEC, Exchange Act § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1970), as
prescribed in Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1973); (2) basic antifraud provisions, Exchange Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970); (3) a requirement of the
disclosure of certain information to accompany the offer itself, Exchange Act § 13(d),
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970); and (4) a restriction on repurchases of securities by the
issuer, Exchange Act § 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1970).
' See generally Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.Y.L.F. 462,
555-66 (1969).
6 Compare Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937
(2d Cir. 1969) (evidencing early hesitance to grant injunction because of fear of upsetting balance between target and offeror) with Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington
Associates, 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973) (illustrating position taken in more recent
decisions that injunctive relief is the only method of insuring fairness). See also Note,
The Courtsand the WilliamsAct: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 991, 100711 (1973) [hereinafter cited as The Courts and the Williams Act].
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granted ostensibly to maintain the status quo pending a decision on
the merits,7 while the permanent injunction is issued to prevent future violations8 or irreparable harm.' Although many forms of equitable relief have been awarded"0 the remedy of damages has been
largely ignored."
The Williams Act was passed to protect investors, but it has been
invoked most frequently by either the incumbent management or the
offeror. 12 Unfortunately, the courts have often granted relief without
considering what remedy would best serve the interest of the shareholders with the result that in many instances the stockholders have
been injured more by the issuance of an injunction than they would
have been by a takeover battle. Several recent decisions, however,
indicate a growing awareness of the purpose of the Williams Act and
an attempt to fashion remedies which protect the investing public
without favoring either target management or the offeror. 4
See, e.g., Checkers Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969); Graphic Sciences, Inc. v. International Mogul Mines Ltd.,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,834 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1974).
8 See, e.g., Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.), cert.
granted,-

U.S.

43 U.S.L.W. 3348 (1974).

-,

See, e.g., Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 113 (7th Cir. 1970).
Io See, e.g., Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247 (2d
Cir. 1973) (rescission, tendering shareholders given opportunity to withdraw tendered
shares); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 947 (2d Cir.
1969) (suggested alternative types of relief).
11In Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1969), Judge Friendly cited the attributes of the preliminary injunction:
[T]he application for a preliminary injunction is the time when relief
can best be given .... [D]istrict judges would do well to ponder
whether, if a violation has been sufficiently proved on an application
for a temporary injunction, the opportunity for doing equity is not
considerably better then than it will be later on. The court will have
a variety of tools usable at that stage.
Id. at 947 (citation omitted).
12See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 910 (1972).
11An injunction that destroys a tender offer also destroys any opportunity for
shareholders to tender their stock at a price substantially above market value. See The
Courtsand the Williams Act, supra note 6, at 1008-09 n.111.
" See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Tri-State Motor Transit Co. v. National City Lines,
505 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1974); Cambridge Fund, Inc. v. Tweedy, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,380 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1974); Graphic Sciences
Inc. v. International Mogul Mines Ltd., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,834 (D.D.C. Oct.
21, 1974). But see, Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.), cert.
granted,-

U.S.

-,

43 U.S.L.W. 3348 (1974).
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The Preliminary Injunction: The Decline of the Defensive
Injunction

The tender offer is a sensitive mechanism to effect corporate takeovers, and much of its success depends on surprise and precise timing. As a defensive tactic, the incumbent management of a target
company often seeks an injunction 5 on several alternative grounds in
an attempt to thwart the success of the tender offer by suspending
or delaying its consummation." By providing for a preliminary injunction pending final adjudication of the case, which is usually a
lengthy process, § 16 of the Clayton Act 7 provides an especially attractive device for target managements seeking to preserve their positions.'" Further, courts have willingly granted preliminary injunctive
Is See, e.g., Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973)
(familiar tactic by the target company is to seek an injunction in an effort to kill tender
offer).
16The allegations of target companies seeking defensive injunctions have not been
limited to asserted violations of the securities laws, but have covered a multitude of
potential violations resulting from the takeover. See, e.g., Gulf & Western Indus., Inc.
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973) (target alleged antitrust law
violations); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 424 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1970)
(target alleged Interstate Commerce Act violations); General Host Corp. v. Triumph
Am., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (target alleged potential violations of the
securities laws, the Shipping Act, and the Communications Act); United Gas Corp. v.
Pennzoil Co., 248 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 354 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir.
1965) (target alleged potential violation of Public Utility Holding Company Act). See
also, E. ARANoW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 266-68 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as ARANow & EINHORN]; Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover
Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. REV. 135, 146 (Mar.-Apr. 1967); Schmults & Kelly, Cash Takeover Bids - Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115, 129 (1967); Comment, Target Company Defensive Tactics Under Section 7 of the ClaytonAct, 4 CONN. L. REV. 352 (1971);
The Courts and the Williams Act, supra note 6, at 1010 & n.118.
, Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
,Judge Friendly in Missouri Portland stated:
This appeal illustrates the growing practice of companies that have
become the target of tender offers to seek shelter under § 7 of the
Clayton Act. . . . Drawing Excalibur from a scabbard. . . the target
company typically hopes to obtain a temporary injunction which may
frustrate the acquisition since the offering company may well decline
the expensive gambit of a trial or, if it persists, the long lapse of time
could so change conditions that the offer will fail even if. . . it should
be determined that no antitrust violation has been shown.
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 883 (1974) (citation omitted). In contrast, the district court judge in this case
indicated that the only harm an injunction would work on the offeror was the cost of
"processing a new tender offer." Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 375 F.
Supp. 249, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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relief to target companies on showings which have not met the requisite equitable standards of probable success on the merits and irreparable injury to the moving party if the injunction were denied.'"
Because the success of its action often depends not on the merits of
its claim at trial, but merely on obtaining the preliminary injunction,
thus delaying the tender offer, the technique is decidedly favorable
to the target management. Even if the offeror is vindicated at trial,
the delay and expense will usually have destroyed the tender offer.2"
The case of Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc.2 presented such an attempted use of the preliminary injunction to defeat
a tender offer. On December 19, 1973, Cargill, Inc. announced a cash
tender offer to purchase all outstanding common stock of Missouri
Portland Cement Co. at approximately twenty-five percent above
market price. On December 21, Missouri Portland sought an injunction to halt the tender offer alleging that, if consummated, the takeover would result in a violation of § 7 .of the Clayton Act,2 and that
the offer itself violated § 14(d) and § 14(e) of the Exchange Act.? The
district court 24 enjoined the tender offer, citing "serious antitrust issues the resolution of which necessitates further investigation," and
the "irreparable harm caused by the disruptive effect [of the tender
offer] on Company morale." While recognizing that the preliminary
injunction may be the most expedient means of avoiding irreparable
,1A plea for a preliminary injunction has traditionally required a showing of
probability of success on the merits and potential irreparable injury. Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959). In recent cases, however, courts have
applied a lower standard requiring only a tipping of the balance of hardships in favor
of the moving party and a serious question going to the merits. See, e.g., Gulf &
Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1973);
Checkers Motor Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 999 (1969); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir.
1953); Kaufman v. Lawrence, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,908 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1974).
20 See, e.g., The Courts and the Williams Act, supra note 6, at 1007-08.
21 Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
2 Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 14(d)-(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(e) (1970).
Missouri Portland alleged inter aliathat Cargill's acquisition of Missouri Portland
would create a violation of the antitrust laws and that by failing to advise investors of
this potential violation Cargill had not properly disclosed all necessary data required
by the securities laws. 498 F.2d at 855, 871-73. See Gulf & Western Indus. v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973), for a case illustrative of the use of
the antitrust laws as a defensive mechanism of target companies.
2,Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd in part, 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
25 375 F. Supp. at 263.
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injury in some instances, the Second Circuit rejected the finding of
the district court that Missouri Portland made a showing of such
harm26 and held that granting the preliminary injunction under less
than traditional equitable standards was improper.2
The Second Circuit first analyzed the antitrust claim, concluding
that "the plaintiff here was a long way from demonstrating the probability of success ordinarily required to warrant preliminary injunctive
relief." 21Then Judge Friendly, speaking for the court, noted that the
interests of Missouri Portland, as a corporate entity, and those of its
shareholders, were distinguishable from those of the incumbent management of Missouri Portland. 9 The court concluded that the interests of the former group would likely be enhanced rather than harmed
by the takeover. 0 Therefore, the injunction was not justified either
on the basis of probably success on the merits or because irreparable
injury would otherwise result.3 ' Finally, in balancing the hardships
between Cargill, Inc. and Missouri Portland, the district court has
stated that the injunction would merely delay the tender offer. 32 The
circuit court, however, noted that past experience demonstrated that
a temporary injunction granted under the antitrust laws was almost
always fatal to the success of a tender offer.3 .
The Second Circuit's opinion in Missouri Portland is promising
evidence that courts may be more willing to examine the realities of
a tender offer situation when determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief. Although Missouri Portland dealt with an antitrust
injunction, recognition that the interests of the corporation and its
stockholders are distinguishable from incumbent management's interest in preserving its position will likely subject the claims of target
companies seeking defensive injunctions in the future to close scru498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
2 498 F.2d at 870. See note 19 supra for a discussion of preliminary relief standards.
U

Is 498 F.2d at 866.

2 Id. at 867. Judge Friendly perceived the loss of position which would befall the
incumbent management upon a successful takeover as not necessarily being harmful
to the corporation.
U The court indicated that in all likelihood the competitive position of the corporation would be enhanced by the takeover. Id.
1' Id. at 870.

2 375 F. Supp. at 258.
n 498 F.2d at 870 & n.38. See also Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F.

Supp. 470, 473-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); ARANow & EumHoR, supra note 16, at 266; Comment, Target Company Defensive Tactics Under Section 7of the ClaytonAct, 4 CoNN.
L. REv. 352, 387-88 (1971); The Courts and The Williams Act, supra note 6, at 1016.
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tiny.34 The target will be required to show potential damage or violations in fact, rather than bald allegations, if future decisions follow
Judge Friendly's example. Finally, although the court did not explicitly reject the relaxed standard for granting a preliminary injunction
in all cases, 35 the fact that it held Missouri Portland to the traditional
standard of probability of success on the merits and irreparable injury" may lead other courts to refuse injunctive relief as a matter of
course.
C.

The PermanentInjunction: The Expansive Remedial Injunction

Unlike the preliminary injunction, which is designed to maintain
the status quo until litigation resolves the issues, 3 the permanent
injunction is a remedial device granted after a full proceeding on the
merits.3 8 Permanent injunctions traditionally are granted only when
there is no adequate remedy at law and irreparable injury to the party
seeking the injunction would otherwise result. 9 In Mosinee Paper
Corp. v. Rondeau ° the Seventh Circuit seemingly ignored these requirements and instructed a district court to issue a permanent injunction against the defendant for a technical violation of § 13(d) of
the Exchange Act.4 Departing from accepted equitable standards the
Seventh Circuit ordered an injunction without a showing of irreparable harm to the plaintiff or evidence of the likelihood of future violations by the defendant.2
In Mosinee Paper the defendant, Rondeau, failed to file a timely
Schedule 13D after he acquired in excess of five percent of the outSee also The Courts and the Williams Act, supra note 6, at 1011.
The Missouri Portland court applied the traditional test. 498 F.2d at 870.
'Id.

See, e.g., Checkers Motor Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969); Graphic Sciences, Inc. v. International Mogul Mines Ltd.,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,834 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1974).
3 D. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES 106 (1973).
3' See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1959). The Securities and Exchange Commission may obtain an injunction when there is a threat that
the wrong may be repeated. See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480
F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959).
,0 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, - U.S. __, 43 U.S.L.W. 3348 (1974).
11Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
,2 500 F.2d at 1017. An injunction places the violator under the shadow of contempt proceedings for any future violations. See generally Note, Injunctive Relief in
SEC Civil Actions: The Scope of JudicialDiscretion, 10 COLUM. J. LAW & Soc. PaOB.
328, 339-42 (1974). Although the Commission did not bring the Mosinee Paperaction,
the same principles apply where private parties institute the action. See note 39 supra.
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standing common stock of Mosinee.13 Upon learning of the filing requirement, Rondeau promptly complied with the statute, but Mosinee nevertheless sought an injunction barring the defendant from
voting his stock because of the violation. Rondeau asserted ignorance
of the five percent filing requirement," and claimed that he had no
intention of seeking control of the company, arguing that his purchases were purely for investment purposes. 5
The district court granted summary judgment denying the plaintiffs request for a permanent injunction,48 holding that injunctive
relief was inappropriate because the defendant had no intent to violate the Act and the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate harm." On
appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit reversed." The court remanded
the case to the district court ordering an injunction permanently
enjoining Rondeau from future violations of § 13(d), and enjoining for
five years voting of the shares acquired between the required and
actual filing dates.
The court recognized that Mosinee failed to show irreparable
harm,49 but reasoned that as the issuer of the securities, Mosinee was
the best enforcer of the filing requirements. The court further reasoned that although no real harm occurred from Rondeau's tardy
filing, to the extent that § 13(d) requires disclosure of large acquisitions of stock evidencing a potential tender offer, 5' Mosinee was de4 Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970), requires any
individual or group acquiring greater than a 5% equity interest in the total outstanding
shares of any public corporation to file a Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1974),
with the Commission. For an analysis of the controversy surrounding "group" formulation under § 13(d) see Vandegrift, Section 13(d) Disclosure:New Guidelines for Group
Therapists, 16 B.C. IND. & Comm. L. REv. 459 (1975).
11The original threshold filing requirements for Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. §
240.13d-101 (1973), was the acquisition of 10% of the outstanding shares. This was
amended to 5% in December, 1970. Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)
(1970), amending 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1968). The violation occurred in May, 1971,
and Rondeau asserted he was unaware of the change. 500 F.2d at 1015.
, Id.
46 Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 354 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. Wis. 1973), rev'd, 500
F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, U.S. _ 43 U.S.L.W. 3348 (1974).
1 354 F. Supp. at 694-95. See also Tri-State Motor Transit Co. v. National City
Lines, 505 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1974). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of injunctive relief because there was no attempt by the defendant to violate
the act and no harm to the plaintiff or shareholders.
500 F.2d at 1011 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, U.S. _,
43 U.S.L.W. 3348
(1974).
11500 F.2d at 1016-17.
0 Id.
51See Vandegrift, Section 13(d) Disclosures: New Guidelines for Group
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layed in any attempt to defend against such a takeover. 52 The majority apparently believed that a distinction between stock acquisitions
for investment purposes and acquisitions with a view towards control
would be impossible. 3 Thus, the majority justified the issuance of the
injunction on the basis of a technical violation of the law, rather than
upon equitable principles.
In a vigorous and convincing dissent, Judge Pell pointed out that
while allowing the issuer to -act as the enforcer of the filing requirements was a justification of the issuer's standing to initiate the action,54 granting an injunction was a remedial, not a standing, problem. Further, although Mosinee was not technically notified of Rondeau's purchases until after the required filing date, the purchases
were "common knowledge, 'street talk' among brokers, bankers, and
businessmen in the community."55 The plaintiff had, in fact, been
monitoring the acquisitions for some time," and was thus in no way
impaired in its ability to defend against a potential takeover attempt. 57 Judge Pell concluded that the majority was placing "form
over substance" and ignoring the investors, while effectively "tipping
the balance of regulation" in favor of imcumbent maragement 5
The issuance of a permanent injunction in Mosinee Paper evidences a dangerous use of the injunction as a punitive as well as a
remedial device. Granting a permanent injunction for a technical
violation with no showing of harm violates the purpose of relief under
the securities law, which is to remedy the aggrieved party. 9 More
Therapists, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 459 (1975).
5' 500 F.2d at 1017.

The court stated that the Act applied regardless of the intent of the purchaser.
Id. at 1016.
", Id. at 1018-19. See also GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 719 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
11500 F.2d at 1020.

61Id. at 1019. Judge Pell distinguished the situation in Mosinee Paperfrom that
in Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970), where the defendant secretly
acquired stock of the unsuspecting target company to strengthen its takeover bid.
"TThe question has been raised whether it is a breach of the fiduciary duty of the
target management to defend against tender offers, especially where they would benefit the corporation. See AnANOW & EiNHORN, supra note 16, at 220-22.
u 500 F.2d at 1020. In Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974),
the court cited Judge Pell's dissent in Mosinee Paperto support the denial of injunctive
relief for a technical violation of § 13(d), when there was no harm to the plaintiff or
the corporation. 386 F. Supp. at 58 & n.16.
51See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968); Note,
Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q.
165.
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disconcerting, however, is the advantage the court was willing to
bestow upon the incumbent management. In dispensing relief under
the Williams Act courts must be aware of two principles. First, the
beneficiary of the Act is the investing public; and second, the court
must not favor either party seeking corporate control." By granting
permanent injunctive relief to the issuer without requiring a showing
of irreparable harm the Seventh Circuit clearly favored the incumbent management.
D. Damages: Something New
Various forms of equitable remedies" have been the mainstay of
relief under the Williams Act. The damages award, although consistent with the intent of the Act,62 has been ignored by the courts as a
remedial device. The failure to award damages is the result of several
factors. The first factor is the difficulty in ascertaining a precise
amount of damages. 3 Perhaps more importantly, the liberal issuance
of preliminary relief in many cases has generally foreclosed any opportunity for consideration of monetary relief. The Second Circuit,"
however, in a decision which-may initiate a trend, ordered the Southern District of New York to grant damages as well as supplemental
injunctive relief for a violation of the Williams Act."
In Chris-CraftIndustries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp." ChrisCraft attempted to gain control of Piper Aircraft through a cash
tender offer for Piper shares. In an effort to defeat the takeover bid
Piper management enlisted the aid of Bangor Punta Corporation,
tendering its Piper stock to Bangor Punta in return for Bangor Punta
" Senator Williams stated that the purpose of the Act was to protect investors
during tender offer battles, while not favoring either the target management or the
offeror. 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams).
Q See, e.g., Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247 (2d
Cir. 1973) (offeror required to correct misstatement; tendering investors given opportunity to withdraw tendered shares); SEC v. OSEC Petroleum, S.A., CCH SEc. L. REP.
94,915 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1974) (late filing of Schedule 13D, fund established for
benefit of persons selling shares after date of required filing; proxy designated to vote
shares).
QzSee H. K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973) (damages are consistent with Congress' intent to protect investors).
" See, e.g., Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247, 251
(2d Cir. 1973).
6 Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973).
" Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), rev'd in part, Civil No. 74-2542, 75-7003 (2d Cir. April 11, 1975).
64480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973).
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stock." Bangor Punta then engaged in a tender offer battle with
Chris-Craft for control of Piper. Prior to Bangor Punta's gaining fiftyone percent of Piper, Chris-Craft unsuccessfully sought a preliminary
injunction, asserting misrepresentations by Piper and Bangor Punta
in violation of the Williams Act disclosure requirementsA After Bangor Punta gained control, thus defeating Chris-Craft's takeover bid,
the latter sought damages. The district court dismissed the claim,
finding no evidence that the alleged misrepresentations had been
relied upon by Chris-Craft, or would have caused any exchanging
shareholder to change his course of action." The Second Circuit,
however, held that Chris-Craft did sustain harm as a result of Bangor
Punta's and Piper's violation and therefore remanded with guidelines
for determining the precise amount of damages."
The Second Circuit instructed the district court to award ChrisCraft damages measured by "the reduction . . .in the appraisal

value of its shares of [Piper] when its opponent's position as a majority owner became established." 7 ' The district court recognized the
abstract nature of this calculation," and therefore relied upon expert
witnesses to determine the value of Chris-Craft's stock before and
after Bangor Punta gained the majority position.73 The essential determination was the premium-the amofint per share in excess of
market value-Chris-Craft had when it held a plurality position and
was still capable of acquiring majority control of Piper, compared to
the value of its holding once that potential was foreclosed by Bangor
11Bangor Punta also agreed to give members of the Piper family an additional
bonus if it was successful in attaining majority status. Id. at 353.
" Chris-Craft alleged violations of Securities Act § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1970);
Rule 135, 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (1974); Exchange Act §§ 9, 10(b) & 14(e), 15 U.S.C.
§§78i, 78j(b) & 78n(e); Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974); Rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-6 (1974). Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 303 F. Supp. 191
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
"0Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), rev'd in part, 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973).
11Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973). For
a discussion of the court's treatment of causation see Duggan & Fairchild, Chris-Craft
Corp. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.: Liability in the Context of a Tender Offer, 35 OHIo ST.
L.J. 312 (1974).
" Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507, 511 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), rev'd in part, Civil No. 74-2542, 75-7003 (2d Cir. April 11, 1975), citing 480 F.2d
341, 380 (2d Cir. 1973).
72 384 F. Supp. 507, 511. See generally A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF
CORPORATIONS 275-308 (5th ed. 1941); Comment, Remedies for Defrauded Tender Offerors Under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 62 GEo. L.J. 1693, 170506 (1974).
71384 F. Supp. at 512.
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Punta's acquiring the majority position.7
In making this calculation-the district court first assessed the fair
'7
market value of Piper stock "uninfluenced by the fight for control.
From the expert opinions presented by each side, the court discarded
the highest and lowest estimates, rounding the average of theremaining opinions to the nearest dollar per share. 7 The court then determined the value of control of Piper discounted by Chris-Craft's probability of obtaining such control. While the court recognized that77
control places a definite premium on the value of a block of stock,
it also recognized that Chris-Craft had no assurance of gaining control. Further, because of the fight for control with Bangor Punta,
Chris-Craft's large plurality position would have had a reduced premium value on the market. 7 Therefore, although the control premium
of Piper would be twenty percent per share above the market value
of each share had there been no opposition, the countervailing factors
in this case reduced Chris-Craft's premium to five percent per share.
The five percent per share premium over the market value on the
date Bangor Punta gained control was the court's assessment of the
by Chris-Craft as a result of Bangor Punta's
monetary loss suffered
7
majority acquisition.
On appeal, however, the Second Circuit found the district court's
damage calculation in error. In reversing, the circuit court noted that
the lower court was correct in attempting to compare the value of
Chris-Craft's holdings of Piper stock before and after Bangor Punta
gained a majority position." However, unlike the Southern District,
the circuit court held that the "before value" of Chris-Craft's holdings was the price actually paid for the Piper stock.8 Thus, Chris74Id.

11Id. at 515. The court refused to accept as a guide the prices paid for the stock
by the parties, because as "contestants" in a "battle" they were inclined to act irrationally, therefore paying "artificially inflated" prices. Id. at n.8.
71Id. at 517.
n Cf. Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). See also Berle, "Control"
In CorporateLaw, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1958); Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate
Control, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 22 (1963).
11384 F. Supp. at 520-21.

19Id. at 523. Supplementing the monetary award was an injunction barring Bangor Punta from voting its ill-gotten shares for 5 years. An injunction was also granted
barring extraordinary corporate activity for five years to prevent Chris-Craft from
abusing its plurality position. Prejudgment credit was awarded under the court's equity powers; however, recognizing the self-interest in Chris-Craft's prosecution of the
suit, attorney's fees were denied. Id. at 523-28.
" Civil No. 74-2542, 75-7003, at 2849 (2d Cir. Apr. 11, 1975).
81Id. at 2853. See note 73 supra.
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Craft's average cost of $64 per share was used as the value of the Piper
shares before Bangor Punta gained control.2 Similarly, the district
court had determined the "after value" of Chris-Craft's block as the
price at which the Piper shares could have been sold on the day
Bangor Punta gained control. The Second Circuit, however, noted
that the only feasible method by which Chris-Craft could have sold
its large holding was through a public offering. Such an offering could
not realistically have taken place within less than four months after
Chris-Craft's opportunity to gain control was foreclosed by Bangor
Punta's victory.3 Therefore, the court valued the Piper shares four
months after Bangor Punta's victory, arriving at a figure of $27 per
share. Consequently, the Second Circuit's calculation resulted in
damages of $37 per share, or almost $26 million, 4 as compared to the
district court's calculation of $2.40 per share, or $1.7 million. Although the Second Circuit noted various uncertainties in determining
damages, it indicated that any risk created by such uncertainties
must be borne by the wrongdoer. 8
The Chris-Craft case represents a most significant development
in the formulation of relief under the Williams Act, and more generally under § 13 and § 14 of the Exchange Act. Although the case
indicates an awareness that the injunction is not the sole means of
87
remedying violations of the securities laws in takeover situations, it
also demonstrates the difficulty courts will encounter in dealing with
2 Civil No. 74-2542, 75-7003, at 2854.
" Judge Timbers, speaking for the court, reiterated the opinions of the experts in
the district court which stated that sale of Piper stock on the exchanges where it was
being traded would have been virtually impossible after Bangor Punta gained majority
status. Chris-Craft's two alternatives for disposing of its Piper shares were a private
placement or a public offering. Because a private placement would have required an
additional discount of 25-30% below what could be obtained through a public offering,
Judge Timbers rejected that alternative. Id. at 2856-57.

Id. at 2859.

384 F. Supp. at 523.
Civil No. 74-2542, 75-7003, at 2858-59, the Second Circuit stated that it was
resolving the uncertainties in favor of those the statute was designed to protect. Applying the Second Circuit's reasoning to this case conflicts with the notion that the courts
are to remain neutral as between the contestants to the tender offer. See, e.g., Mosinee
Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.) (Pell, J., dissenting), cert. granted,
43 U.S.L.W. 3348 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1974).
"TSee H. K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973). After
the Second Circuit remanded Chris-Craftwith a direction to award damages, the First
Circuit in Nicholson followed the lead and ordered damages consistent with common
law notions of tortious interference with "prospective advantage." Id. at 424. See also
Comment, Remedies for Defrauded Tender Offerors Under § 14(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 62 GEo. L.J. 1693, 1705-07 (1974).
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valuation of securities. The gross disparity in damage calculations
illustrates the potential for error which may cause other courts to shy
away from monetary relief. On the other hand, the enormous recovery
given Chris-Craft may motivate other contestants in tender offer battles to seek damages rather than injunctive relief.
Although the Williams Act was passed with the intention of protecting private investors without favoring either side in the tender
offer,88 the sheer size of the Second Circuit's damage award appears
frighteningly punitive toward the tender offer victor, especially considering that the defeated party had no assurance of success. The
district court's refusal to grant Chris-Craft's attorney's fees and fashioning of injunctive relief to protect Bangor Punta's interest emphasized that court's recognition that although the parties may be enforcing the securities laws to the benefit of the public, they are primarily motivated by self-interest. The Second Circuit, however, apparently ignored Chris-Craft's motives for entering the tender offer
battle initially,
and awarded it damages as if it were a "protected
89
party.
E.

A Look at FutureRelief Under the Williams Act

The recent decisions under the Williams Act demonstrate both
the need and the willingness of courts to reassess the value of the
injunction as the exclusive remedial device. While the preliminary
injunction has the benefit of maintaining the status quo and preventing potential harm, too often the incumbent management of the target company seeks an injunction to ward off a proper tender offer,"0
many times at the expense of shareholders who wish to sell their
shares at a price substantially above market." Judge Friendly's opinion in Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc.2 will hopefully
initiate a realistic appraisal by the courts of the nature of the tender
offer. Unlike the Seventh Circuit's decision in Mosinee PaperCorp.
v. Rondeau,"3 which favored the incumbent management, Judge
u 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967). See generally Comment, Tender Offers: An Analysis
of the Earl Development of Standing to Sue Under § 14(e), 5 TEx. TECH L. REV. 779
(1974).
0 Civil No. 74-2542, 75-7003, at 2858-59, citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 385 (1970). The Second Circuit indicated that the Williams Act was passed
to protect the contestants in the tender offer as well as investors.
So See note 18 supra.
, See generally The Courts and the Williams Act, supranote 6, at 995-96, 1012.
92 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
-3500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.), cert.granted, -U.S.
_ 43 U.S.L.W. 3348 (1974).
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Friendly, in rejecting the target's plea for an injunction, recognized
the self-preserving motives of the incumbent management of the target company and urged the courts to maintain strict neutrality
amidst the legal maneuvering.94
The damage remedy fashioned in Chris-CraftIndustries Corp. v.
PiperAircraft Corp.95 is also evidence that the Second Circuit and the
Southern District are attempting to formulate the most appropriate
relief, not the most expedient.98 Although other methods of calculation may be developed, the damage remedy promotes the policy of
the Act by allowing a tender offer to reach fruition unhampered by
premature imposition of an injunction, yet provides adequate relief
to an aggrieved party." Also, the threat of a damages judgment arguably deters potential violations as successfully as the threat of an
injunction.98
In granting relief under the Williams Act courts should follow the
Second Circuit's example and formulate remedies which take into
account the nature and circumstances of the particular violation.99
Most importantly, relief must be granted that will protect the investing public without unduly favoring either the target companies or
offerors. Judge Pell, in his dissent in Mosinee Paper,noted the lack
of sensitivity of the courts to the problems of relief and the aims of
the Act:
To grant an injunction on the sole basis of a belated filing
appears to me to be exalting form over substance, to be bringing an artificial and unduly restrictive sanction into the law of
securities, and to be ignoring the real purpose of the Williams
Act, which "was designed for the benefit of the investors and
not to tip the balance of regulation either in favor of manage498 F.2d at 850.
384 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
'6 The court was aware of the inequalities that would result from granting ChrisCraft both damages and injunctive relief. Therefore, it issued an order preventing
Chris-Craft from abusing its plurality position. 384 F. Supp. at 524-25.
In Kaufman v. Lawrence, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., 94,908 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5,
1974), the plaintiff alleged material misstatements in an exchange offer prospectus in
violation of § 10(b) and § 14(e) of the 1934 Act. The court denied the requested
preliminary injunction, stating that if there was a violation damages would adequately
compensate the plaintiff's injury. Cf. Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. v. Haynie,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.,
94,873 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1974) (aggrieved plaintiff has
adequate remedy at law for proxy disclosure omission).
"8See H. K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir. 1973).
" See generally The Courts and the Williams Act, supra note 6, at 1011-18.

